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~ ~ There is nothing new about revising neutrality; it has undergone an 
almost constant process of revision in detail," Philip Jessup con-
cluded in 1936.2 He also believed 
... [N]othing could be more fallacious than the attempt to test the application of 
rules of neutrality by the principles of logic. Since they are products of 
compromise and of experience, logic has found practically no place in their 
development and cannot properly be used in their application.3 
Over half a century into the UN Charter era, litde would change these obser-
vations, even in the infonnation warfare (IW)4 context. New considerations 
have appeared,5 including the Charter itself; the process of analyzing the law of 
neutrality defies a straightforward, positivist, black-letter approach. Principles of 
neutrality for maritime warfare have been seen to be less rigid, from an historical 
perspective, than those for air or land warfare,6 for example. 
Some claim neutrality is in "chronic obsolescence."7 A majorreason, accord-
ing to those who say future applications of the law of neutrality will be minimal, 
is an argument that the Charter has ended the rights and duties of the old law of 
neutrality.8 Another argument is that since the Charter has oudawed war,9 there 
can be no state of war, and therefore there is no need for a law of neutrality .10 
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(This position might be considered in light of the Pact of Paris [1928], outlawing 
aggressive war.11 World War II began a decade later.) 
Many others, reflecting State practice and claims in the Charter era, maintain that 
the law of neutrality continues to exist. The San Rema Manual recognizes maritime 
neutrality.12 The 1992-96 International Law Association Committee on Maritime 
Neutrality studied neutrality, and the 1998 ILA conference accepted the Commit-
tee's final report.13 Individual researchers assert that neutrality remains a valid legal 
concept, albeit modified by the impact of the Charter and other considerations.14 
Like the reports of Mark Twain's passing, accounts of neutrality's demise in 
the Charter era have been greatly exaggerated, as, the ensuing analysis of the ap-
plication of neutrality principles to information warfare demonstrates. 
Application of the Principles of the Law of Neutrality 
to Information Warfare 
The law of warfare has little, if any, direct reference to problems of armed 
conflict involving IW. The Charter applies across the board to all treaties, and 
perhaps customary law as well.1S Although there are a few treaties ,vith some 
bearing on transmission of information, e.g., Hague V and XIII, in most cases 
the analysis must proceed from general custom, general principles, and analysis 
by analogy. General principles of law occupy an anomalous position among 
sources of international law. Although the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice lists them among primary sources that may be cited in cases before the 
Court,16 and some commentators include them among primary sources for de-
riving rules of law,17 others accord them secondary status, perhaps as 
gap-fillers. 18 Whichever view one might take, in a new and fast-moving area of 
the law where there are few guideposts, resort to general principles oflaw, and 
commentators that discuss them,19 may be the only sources that are available. 
What then should be the method of analysis for IW issues? 
The first and primary rule should be application of mandatory Charter norms, 
e.g., the right of self-defense, with, e.g., its limitations of necessity and propor-
tionality for reaction in self-defense,2o or UN Security Council decisions.21 The 
next level of analysis should employ the mixture of treaties, custom, etc. that 
must apply in specific neutrality situations. For example, if Hague V and XIII 
principles applicable to telecommunications are customary law, they should 
be applied, perhaps alongside general law of armed conflict (LOAC) principles 
such as necessity and proportionality in a given situation, except where there is a 
prohibitory rule, e.g., no first use of poison gas, for which there can be no 
proportionality or necessity qualifications.22 In applying these principles to the 
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modality of transmitting Internet messages, States will indirecdy affect use of and 
messages through the Internet. The fact that cables may be used for Internet-
based messages as well as traditional telephone or telegraph messages can be ne-
cessity and proportionality factors. 
Where there is no "hard law," i.e., black-letter rules governing conduct, re-
sort must be had to general customary LOAC principles, i.e. military objective, 
necessity and proportionality, which may be different from similar principles to 
be observed in self-defense responses.23 The content of the law for these situa-
tions might be informed by analogies from custom, treaties and principles ap-
plied in the law ofland, sea, air and space law. As will be seen, the law of the sea 
(LOS) and the law of naval warfare may offer the most and best analogies for 
neutrals in IW situations. 
Neutrality, Land Warfare, and Information Warfare 
The implications for IW from the law of neutrality relating to neutral land 
territory are several. The Charter may impact decisions on the law of neutrality, 
and treaty suspension or termination principles may apply for international 
agreements other than those dealing with warfare.24 The Security Council may 
make legally binding decisions under Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter, and 
therefore may obligate UN Members under Articles 41-42 to take action that 
might be inconsistent with traditional neutrality principles. The Council also 
may make nonbinding "call[s] upon" Members under Articles 40-41. It also 
may make nonbinding recommendations under Articles 39-40. If Council deci-
sions differ from traditional neutrality principles, the latter must give way.25 If 
Council or General Assembly resolutions are at variance from traditional neu-
trality principles, and restate customary or other binding sources oflaw,26 these 
resolutions also will affect the traditional law of neutrality.27 
Thus, Council decisions may compel a State to behave inconsistendy with 
traditional neutrality practice by requiring what would otherwise be belligerent 
acts or by restricting rights neutrals traditionally enjoy.28 Nevertheless, belliger-
ent attacks must be conditioned on general warfare principles of military objec-
tive, necessity, and proportionality.29 
A neutral has a duty to prevent use of its territory for a belligerent's opera-
tions, base, or as a sanctuary.30 The activity, depending on personnel involved, 
e.g., belligerent forces operating the Internet computer, may be a violation of 
the neutral's territorial integrity under the Charter.31 If a neutral knows or has 
reason to know of activity within its territory involving Internet use that is 
non-neutral in nature, the neutral must act to end that activity under the LOAC, 
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and may invoke the Charter if the activity involves a violation of the neutral's 
territorial integrity. If a neutral may be required to mobilize forces to ensure ful-
fillment of its responsibility to prevent belligerent forces from crossing into neu-
tral territory, and thus act in self-defense,32 by analogy it may be argued that a 
neutral may mobilize or order its forces to counter an Internet attack conducted 
from its territory, even if a belligerent's forces are not involved. If war materials 
and supplies belonging to a belligerent, either as a matter of title or use, are em-
ployed in an Internet attack while situated within a neutral's borders, the neutral 
can act against the materials and supplies. Ifbelligerent forces operate the com-
puters, etc., the case for neutral action is stronger. 
If a neutral does not or cannot effectively enforce compliance, an aggrieved 
belligerent may take proportional action, either under the law of self-defense or 
the LOAC, to counter these Internet activities.33 Of course, there is a risk that 
the neutral may assert a violation of its territorial integrity by the aggrieved bel-
ligerent and resort to self-defense measures.34 In these situations, an aggrieved 
belligerent's prior notice to the neutral may be prudent, unless the neutral is seen 
to be cooperating ,vith the offending belligerent. 
Ifbelligerents may not build radio stations on neutral territory, by analogy 
they cannot use Internet "stations" in neutral territory, and a neutral must shut 
these down.35 If a neutral does not have the means, or the willingness to do so, an 
aggrieved belligerent may take proportional action.36 It would seem, however, 
that if neutrals need not control their own stations, or acts of their nationals act-
ingin a private capacity,37 then there is no obligation to do the same for Internet 
information thus passed to a belligerent under the Hague law. Query whether 
the pattern of neutrals' controlling radio stations in two W orId Wars38 gives cre-
dence to establishing a customary norm obliging neutrals to do so in future 
conflicts. 
The land warfare rules for railway rolling stock offer an interesting parallel. 
Hague V provides that belligerents may not requisition railway rolling stock of 
companies chartered by a neutral State except if absolutely necessary.39 How-
ever, if a private company chartered by a neutral consents to the stock's use for 
warlike purposes, the stock acquires enemy character and may be seized and ap-
propriated as though it is enemy State property.40 If a belligerent may not use 
neutral-owned rolling stock unless absolutely necessary but may seize stock a 
belligerent uses for carrying war goods, could it not be argued by analogy that a 
belligerent may not "seize" neutrals' Internet transmissions except in emer-
gency, but that if the neutral allows the Internet to be used for messages harmful 
to the belligerent, those aspects of the Internet are fair game? 
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Humanitarian law allows a neutral to authorize passage of wounded and sick 
from belligerent forces if vehicles transporting them carry no combatants or war 
materials. If a neutral allows passage, the neutral assumes responsibility for pro-
viding for control and safety of these personnel. 41 If a neutral has discretion to 
authorize passage for belligerents' sick and wounded armed forces personnel 
while assuming responsibility for their control and safety, it would seem that the 
neutral may, but is not required to, allow Internet messages regarding belligerent 
sick and wounded, if the neutral can be sure that no information affecting the 
war is passed home.42 Similarly, a prisoner of war staying in neutral territory43 
may not be allowed Internet access to send information home that amounts to 
belligerent activity, any more than the prisoner of war should be allowed to mail, 
telephone, televise, etc., such information. 
Neutrality at Sea, Naval Warfare, and Information Warfare 
The same Charter principles applicable to land warfare apply to war at sea, in-
cluding any IW component.44 Oceans users, whether neutral or belligerent, 
must pay due regard45 to other oceans users' rights and freedoms besides the rules 
of naval warfare, which apply in armed conflict situations through the LOS con-
ventions' other rules clauses.46 Treaty suspension or termination principles also 
may apply. Although many treaties may bear on IW issues, during armed con-
flict they may be impossible to perform,47 fundamental change of circumstances 
may intervene,48 or there may be a material breach.49 Jus cogens norms, e.g., per-
haps the inherent right of self-defense, 50 may trump treaty law. 51 War, or armed 
conflict, may end or suspend treaty obligations. 52 General principles of necessity 
and proportionality in attack govern as in land warfare. 53 
Hague XIII, governing maritime neutrality, imposes virtually the same rules 
as Hague V, governing land warfare, in forbidding belligerent use of neutral 
ports and waters for erecting wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus for 
communicating \vith belligerent forces. Belligerents cannot use neutral ports or 
waters as a base of operations. 54 The same considerations and applications of 
these principles in land warfare to IW issues should apply in maritime warfare sit-
uations.55 Moreover, because these principles appear in two major multilateral 
treaties and the regional Maritime Neutrality Convention, their common prin-
ciples are strengthened. 56 
There is an important difference between neutrals' duties with respect to 
movement ofbelligerent troops across neutral land territory and movement of 
belligerent naval forces into neutral ports and waters. The duty to repel troop 
movements is absolute, while the duty to detect and oust belligerent naval 
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forces is subject to the neutral's having the means to do so.57 A neutral is only 
"entided," not required, to intern a belligerent warship when that warship 
should have departed neutral waters. 58 When the Hague Conventions were 
signed in 1907, there were many countries that may not have had naval forces 
or detection capability sufficient to oust a belligerent naval force or to intern it. 
There must have been a presumption that any State could use its military or 
other forces, perhaps police, to repel a belligerent troop movement, but that 
might not be the case for naval incursions. The same is true today. For IW 
neutrality principles, it could be argued that the duty of a neutral to act to pre-
vent belligerent IW warfare from within its territory is not absolute, but condi-
tional on the ability of the neutral to detect IW activity and to be able to act to 
counter this activity. Not every country has computer and related systems as 
sophisticated as, e.g., the United States, and these countries should not be held 
to an absolute duty. Such being the case, computer-sophisticated nations like 
the United States must be held to the same duty, i.e., use of means at the dis-
posal of the United States, which might be quite considerable. 
Principles governing destruction of undersea cables strengthen a view that 
belligerents can operate to seize or destroy Internet connections in enemy ter-
ritory and in areas subject to no State's sovereignty, e.g., the high seas, if a bel-
ligerent controls that area, e.g., for blockade. Belligerents can seize or destroy 
cables connecting enemy territory with neutral territory, but only a terminus 
in enemy territory. These cables may be seized or destroyed only "in cases of 
absolute necessity," i.e., general principles of necessity and proportionality59 
must be observed. No distinction is made between publicly and privately 
owned cables.6o Neutrals' control of radio broadcasting within their territorial 
waters during two World Wars61 is another example of proper control of elec-
tronic emissions by neutrals within their territories. If neutrals had this obliga-
tion for radio, the "Internet" of the day, is it not also true for today's World 
Wide Web of communications? 
Issues related to contraband, visit and search or diversion, and the possibility 
of destruction of neutral merchant ships that have acquired enemy character62 or 
ships or aircraft that are believed to be aiding the enemy although othenvise ex-
empt63 might seem to have litde to do with IW. However, certain general prin-
ciples might be derived and used in the IW context. 
Given Internet technology's exponential growth, it would seem extraordi-
narily useless to go through a lengthy treaty negotiation process to draft an agree-
ment listing prohibited Internet behaviors or actions that would be as out of date 
as the computers that began to produce the treaty at the start of the drafting and 
negotiation process. This has been the experience of trying to define 
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contraband. The lesson from contraband law is that in a fast-developing or 
ever-changing scenario, trying to go beyond general principles is rarely wise, ex-
cept in the obvious, "hospital ship" or poison gas situation, where everyone 
agrees on the rules, at least for hospital ships if they are not used to further an en-
emy war effort, and for poison gas as long as there is no use.64 
If we analogize dealing \vith Internet messages to neutral merchantmen on 
the high seas, could an electronic "visit and search," followed by appropriate 
proportional and necessary action, perhaps electronic diversion, be devised for 
belligerents to use with neutrals?65 
If an Internet message or "hack" contributes to enemy war-fighting or 
war-sustaining efforts, assists an enemy's armed forces intelligence system, or 
acts as an auxiliary military or naval channel of communication or information, 
is not the attack and destruction option available, subject to necessity and pro-
portionality principles?66 To be sure, perhaps special principles analogous to the 
passenger and crew safety rule when a merchantman must be destroyed,67 might 
be devised. For example, if messages relating to safety of civilians are involved, 
can they be electronically isolated and allowed through? 
Might an electronic "firewall" analogous to blockade principles in the law of 
naval warfare68 be devised to let appropriat<:; messages get through? The Internet 
might be used for traditional blockades and other interdictions, besides the usual 
Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and Notices to Mariners (NOTMARs) pub-
lished, e.g., by radio. 
Is it useful to think in terms of specific exemptions for neutral Internet usage? 
Hague XI lists enemy vessels exempt from capture and possible destruction be-
cause of their nature, among them a debatable exemption for mails as distin-
guished from mail ships. 69 Would it be helpful to develop exempted computer 
systems, kinds of messages, or Internet systems exempt from "capture" and pos-
sible destruction unless used to aid an enemy? What about generally exempt 
ships, e.g., hospital ships unless they aid an enemy, that send Internet-based mes-
sages that might be construed by a belligerent to be encrypted messages? Would 
this raise a suspicion, however unfounded, such that use ofInternet-based mes-
sages by neutral exempt vessels should be banned or somehow restricted? Can 
system segregation be done with today's technology? Is it too early for this? 
Could the Internet itselfbe used to advise of these exemptions, if a case by case 
basis seems appropriate? 
Might military commanders consider declaring control of immediate areas of 
military operations on the Internet, analogous to the immediate area of naval op-
erations?70 To be sure, this kind of declaration may invite more trouble than it is 
worth, i.e., it could tell adversaries where to go. The Internet can, df course, be 
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used to send these notices, besides NOTAMs and NOTMARs sent by more tra-
ditional means for addressees who lack Internet capability, or to assure transmis-
sion and receipt, i.e., where there is a possibility that an Internet-based message 
did not go through. 
Although it is not part of the law of neutrality, any country can declare tem-
porary use of the high seas for naval maneuvers, including air operations.71 
These maneuvers can be conducted during armed conflict. Is there a correla-
tive right of declaring temporary use of part of the Internet for "IW maneu-
vers"? Might notice of these IW maneuvers be posted on the Internet besides 
more traditional means, e.g., NOTAMs or NOTMARs? (As in the case of 
warning of immediate area of naval operations during war, such a notice, 
whether by NOTAM or NOTMAR through traditional media or the Inter-
net, invites attention.) 
Could or should an "Internet exclusion zone" be declared,72 warning neu-
trals of higher risk if they "surf' in the area or otherwise use the "zone"? Like no-
tices for immediate areas of naval operations, these warnings could be posted on 
the Internet, as well as by more traditional means, e.g., NOT AMs and 
NOTMARs. (Notice of blockade, immediate area of naval operations, or ex-
clusion zones, must be effective;73 while the Internet might be a valuable com-
munication medium, it cannot replace more traditional and widely available 
methods until it has become as universal as more traditional means; this may be a 
problem for vessels flagged in countries that are not as advanced in Internet tech-
nology as, e.g., the United States.) 
Could States declare temporary "defense zones" for parts of the Internet 
spectrum, analogous,to a high seas defense zone or cordon sanitaire that may be 
announced for an area of naval and air operations, to warn other countries of a 
risk of self-defense responses? This is not a feature of naval warfare but an inci-
dent of self-defense.74 And because the technology is still emerging, and any 
treaty now might be premature,75 down the road when and if the problem set-
tles down, could agreements modeled on the INC SEA agreements76 be con-
sidered to minimize confrontation? Longstanding treaties promoting safety at 
sea offer another model.77 
Might states proclaim an "Internet Identification Zone" (lIZ) for parts of the 
Internet spectrum, analogous to an ADIZ?78 The lIZ would be a warning, per-
haps published on the Internet and in other sources to assure notice, of a possibil-
ity of interception if Internet users approach too close to a neutral State's vital 
interests (analogous to its territory, the anchor for an AD IZ), including, e.g., de-
fense and central economic communications systems. The ADIZ is not an air 
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warfare feature; it serves as an identification method. An IIZ might have a similar 
function. 
I do not have technical competence to respond to these questions, or perhaps 
to ask others, but might they be asked? Some inquiries may be far-fetched or im-
practical, but given the exponential growth of technology, some of which may 
be shrouded for national security reasons, I ask them. 
The Internet is like a merchant shipping system or the US public highway sys-
tem. There is no regulation of the Internet akin to systems regulating radio and 
television broadcasting. It is up to the individual or government as to the nature 
of vehicles used (the computers) and, beyond a small access charge paid Internet 
access providers, the user is largely on its own as to how the Internet is employed 
as to content and destination. Therefore, although there may be belligerent and 
neutral rights, perhaps by analogy to those for naval warfare as I have posited 
them, there are relatively few positive duties, apart from a requirement to re-
spect belligerents' and neutrals' rights, however those may be stated. 
As a final point, the due regard principle, derived from the LOS and its law of 
naval warfare counterpart,79 might be part of the analysis; i.e., belligerents must 
have due regard for rights ofInternet users that are neutral, even as Internet users 
must have due regard for others on the Net in the absence of armed conflict. And 
even as belligerents must have due regard for the maritime environment in to-
day's wars at sea, might they be required to have due regard for the general 
Internet environment? 
Neutrality, Aerial Warfare, and Information Warfare 
As in the cases ofland and sea warfare, Charter principles may apply in given 
situations.80 Treaty suspension or termination principles may apply.81 Besides 
air warfare rules, belligerents must observe principles of military objective, ne-
cessity, and proportionality applying to all modes of war. 82 
Like neutrality rules for land and sea warfare, air warfare rules require respect 
for neutral airspace; belligerent military aircraft cannot enter it.83 When coupled 
\vith identical treaty-based neutrality rules applicable to land and sea warfare, 
this principle is strengthened.84 The Hague Air Rules principle, the same as 
those for land warfare but differing from the weaker requirements for neutrals 
for naval warfare, is that actions taken by a neutral to enforce neutral rights, can-
not be construed as a hostile act.85 Since two branches of the law of neutrality 
protect the neutral in its actions to enforce neutrality, particularly since Internet 
activity necessarily ultimately involves the land in terms of sending and recep-
tion of messages, and the flight of Internet messages through lines might be 
241 
Neutrality and Information Watfare 
analogized to aircraft flight, should not the rule be that actions taken by a neutral 
should not be deemed a hostile act, and not an unfriendly one, as the law of naval 
warfare has it? A neutral might enforce its rights by an unfriendly act, i.e., a 
retorsion,86 a lesser action in that it does not involve proportional reprisals, i.e., 
an unlawful act designed to compel compliance.87 
There is an important difference between neutrals' duties with respect to 
movement of belligerent troops across neutral land territory and movement of 
belligerent naval forces into neutral ports and waters, or movement ofbelliger-
ent military aircraft into neutral airspace. The duty to repel troop movements is 
absolute, while the duty to detect and oust belligerent naval or air forces is sub-
ject to a neutral having the means to do so.88 When the Hague Conventions 
were signed, many countries may not have had naval forces or detection capabil-
ity sufficient to oust a belligerent naval force. The same assumption may underlie 
the 1923 Hague Air Rules regarding intruding belligerent military aircraft and 
their internment. There must have been a presumption that any State could use 
its military or other forces, perhaps police, to repel belligerent troop move-
ments, but that might not be the case for every country for naval or military air-
craft incursions. The same is true today. For IW neutrality rules, it could be 
argued that a neutral's duty to act to prevent belligerent IW from '\vithin its terri-
tory is not absolute, but conditional on the neutral's ability to detect IW activity 
and to act to counter it. Not every nation has computer and related systems as so-
phisticated as, e.g., the United States, and these countries should not be held to 
an absolute duty. Such being the case, computer-sophisticated nations like the 
United States must be held to the same duty, i.e., use of means at the disposal of 
the .United States, which might be quite considerable. 
A neutral's duty to prescribe a route away from belligerents' military opera-
tions for aircraft ordered by a belligerent89 might be seen, by analogous prece-
dent for IW, to say a neutral must prescribe Internet "routes" not to interfere 
with military operations. The qualifying phrase in the Hague Air Rules, that a 
neutral must exact guarantees, indicates a possible weakness of the prescription, 
however. For IW, if a neutral prescribes a "route," can the neutral enforce the 
prescription, given the Internet's decentralized nature? The Hague Air Rules 
principle that a neutral must, commensurate with the means at its disposal, pre-
vent aerial observation of belligerent operations,90 is in the same vein. Should 
neutrality law for IW say that a neutral must, commensurate with the means at its 
disposal, prevent IW observation, through reading Internet traffic, ofbelligerent 
military operations? 
The Hague Air Rules, like naval warfare rules, allow a belligerent's force 
commander to prohibit neutral aircraft from passing in an immediate vicinity of 
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a commander's forces or to make aircraft follow a particular route, if the com-
mander considers the aircraft is likely to prejudice success of military operations. 
If an aircraft, once notified, refuses to comply, a belligerent may fire on it.91 In 
the IW context, might a belligerent assert a similar right to prohibit Internet ac-
tivity in an immediate electronic or physical vicinity of military operations, or 
direct that Internet traffic follow routes? Can the belligerent "shoot down" non-
complying Internet traffic, using proportional means, coming close to military 
Internet operations, after notice? Might notice of these areas of operations be 
posted on the Internet besides more traditional means? (A correlative problem is 
that any radio or Internet message invites attention to the location of belligerent 
forces.) 
Although it is not part of the law of neutrality, any country can declare tem-
porary use of the high seas for naval maneuvers, including air operations.92 
These maneuvers can be conducted during armed conflict. Is there a correlative 
right of declaring temporary use of part of the Internet for "IW maneuvers"? 
Might notice of these "maneuvers" be posted on the Internet? (As in the case of 
the warning of the immediate area of naval operations during war, such a notice, 
whether by NOTAM or NOTMAR through traditional media or the Internet, 
invites attention.) 
Exclusion zones for neutral aircraft as well as ships, reasonable in scope and 
duration and which are properly noticed, are a valid method of warfare at sea to-
day. They are not free-fire zones but are designed to warn neutral aircraft of 
heightened danger if they enter a zone.93 Might an "IW exclusion zone" with 
similar qualifications be declared to warn Internet users of a heightened risk of 
being "fired on" if they venture into certain "areas" of the Internet? Might no-
tice of these zones by NOTAMs and NOTMARs be posted on the Internet be-
sides more traditional means? 
Could States declare temporary "defense zones" for certain parts of the 
Internet spectrum, analogous to a high seas defense zone or cordon sanitaire that 
may be announced for an area of air operations, to warn other countries of a risk 
of self-defense responses? This is not a feature of air warfare but an incident of 
self-defense. Here too INCSEA and safety of life at sea treaties could be models 
for advance agreements for these situations.94 
Might States proclaim an "Internet Identification Zone" (lIZ) for certain 
parts of the Internet spectrum, analogous to the ADIZ?95 The lIZ would be a 
warning, perhaps published on the Internet and in other sources to assure notice, 
of a possibility of interception if Internet users approach too close to a neutral 
State's vital interests (analogous to its territory, the anchor for an ADIZ) , includ-
ing, e.g., its defense and central economic communications systems. The ADIZ 
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is not a feature of air warfare; it serves as an identification method. The lIZ might 
have a similar function. 
Neutrality and Information Warfare in Space 
There is little new "hard law" in norms applicable to conflict in outer 
space,96 other than applying Charter law,97 the law of suspension or termina-
tion of treaties,98 and general principles of necessity and proportionality, and 
perhaps due regard in some cases, applying to armed conflict anywhere.99 
There is no special neutrality law like that applying to land, sea, or air warfare. 
Any law of neutrality applicable to IW in space must be derived by analogy 
from these other sources, as was the case before agreements like the Outer 
Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, etc., 
were negotiated. lOO And it is this general methodology that may be the most 
useful. Iflaw for outer space could be derived by analogy from other systems 
before formal treaties appeared, cannot the same be said for IW? Which legal 
system(s) should supply the model(s)? 
Conclusions: Appraisal of Neutrality in the Charter Era 
in the Context of Information Warfare 
As the manned space flight era became a reality, commentators recom-
mended applying other, well-established law to space age situations by analogy. 
UN Charter law applies to situations in space, as it does for interactions on land, 
at sea, and in the air. Today treaties, and practice pursuant to them, govern many 
other aspects of space interactions, but not all of them. These agreements are 
subject to Charter law primacy and to law of treaties rules for suspension or ter-
mination. Beyond the treaties, some space law issues remain unresolved, and ap-
plying other systems oflaw by analogy seems to be the norm. 
Internet warfare issues involving neutrals, and the law to be applied to them, 
seem close to the situation for warfare in space. Charter-based norms, e.g., pro-
hibition against violating States' territorial integrity or political independence, 
the right of self-defense and the primacy of Security Council decisions, must be 
applied. There are telecommunications treaties to which Charter norms and law 
of treaties rules for suspension and termination are subject. Some LOAC princi-
ples, e.g., those related to telegraphy, will apply to Internet messages as well as 
more conventional communications, although these are also subject to Charter 
norms, e.g., self-defense. Beyond these relatively well-established norms, there 
are many principles, primarily in the law of naval warfare but also some from the 
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law ofland and air warfare, that may be cited by analogy in IW situations involv-
ing neutrals. 
Undeniably neutrality as a general concept has as much vitality today as in the 
pre-Charter era. The claim, that there is a customary right to assert an intermedi-
ate status of nonbelligerency between traditional neutrality and belligerency, 
may have been strengthened since 1945, although most States and commenta-
tors do not recognize it. The precedents in some cases are almost identical with 
those in the last two centuries. Even if nonbelligerency cannot be asserted as a 
customary norm, the overlay of principles of self-defense, retorsion, reprisals not 
involving use of force, and state of necessity apply to support actions at variance 
,vith a practice of strict neutrality in the traditional sense.10l 
Because of options under the Charter for non-binding resolutions by the Se-
curity Council and perforce the General Assembly, the potential for exceptions 
even with a binding Council decision and the opportunity for claims of neutral-
ity-perhaps modified by a new non-belligerency concept in the Charter 
era-remains large. "Far from being moribund, these traditional rights [of neu-
trality and self-defense] apply logically in conditions of limited wars" -the type 
of conflicts that have beset the planet since 1945-even more rigorously than in 
conditions of total war.102 
The advent of information war may call for modifYingJessup's remarks pub-
lished in 1936 when the world was recovering from a world war and preparing 
for the next one.103 Transoceanic communication was dependent on undersea 
cables for urgent messages, although radio signals could also reach across the seas. 
The most advanced countries had cross-border telephone and telegraph access 
by landlines. Most transoceanic communications went by ship, although the first 
international air mail deliveries were beginning for transoceanic and transconti-
nental communications. However, the usual means of communication then for 
most messages was what we call "snail mail" today. The Internet was a Cold War 
creation.104 Today, Jessup might say that although the basic neutrality rules re-
main in place and they apply for IW, their application for IW must be by 
analogy. 
One option is a non-law analysisl05 although that alternative is less than fash-
ionable today, given a tendency to find some law (perhaps publicist's views if 
there is no customary law, treaty, or general principle available).106 Commenta-
tors correctly assert that it is almost universally accepted that a considerable body 
oflaw applies to States' use of force in cyberspace contexts.107 If that is true, a 
correlative is that the considerable body of traditional neutrality law, some of it 
restated in treaties oflongstanding duration that are now almost universally rec-
ognized as declaring custom, and the rest in customary norms or general 
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principles, also exists. If we choose to operate in the context oflaw, under a rule 
oflaw, the law of neutrality developed for more traditional warfare modalities 
offers useful analysis by analogy where there are no positive standards, e.g., rules 
governing cables. 
Today one exception to the traditional law is Charter law, e.g., the inherent 
right to individual and collective self-defense, which predates the Charter. 
Others include prohibitions against violating a State's territorial integrity, and 
the primacy of UN Security Council decisions. lOS Another might be human 
rights, although human rights treaties' derogation clauses reflect traditional 
rules of suspension or termination during international armed conflict.109 The 
policies of peacetime telecommunications treaties, although perhaps limited in 
application during armed conflict because of their terms or because of general 
rules of treaty suspensions or termination, are another.110 Analysis ofIW issues 
in a context of the law of neutrality as it applies to land, sea, and air warfare re-
veals common denominators and differences. For example, belligerents have a 
duty not to cross neutral's land territory by land or air, or to use neutral land or 
seas (i.e., the territorial sea) for a base of operations.lll A neutral's duty to repel 
these incursions varies with the modality of incursion. If it is by land, there is 
apparendy an absolute duty, at least to try. If the incursion is by belligerent air 
or naval forces, the neutrals' duty is relative. It must use the means at its dis-
posal to counter an incursion, including means at its disposal to intern an in-
truding aircraft and those aboard. A neutral may elect to detain a belligerent 
warship that has remained in port when it is not entided to stay there. Un-
doubtedly the 1907 Hague drafters, and the 1923 Commission of Jurists that 
prepared the Hague Air Rules, believed every country had some semblance of 
ground forces to repel a belligerent's troop movements across neutral lands, but 
that not every State had the means of detecting or repelling incursions by air or 
sea, or of interning belligerent military vessels or aircraft. ll2 The "means at a 
neutral's disposal" principle should be the test for a neutral's duty for 
belligerents' IW incursions; the neutral should be held to apply the means at its 
disposal to detect and repel these incursions. Such being the case, the correla-
tive right of a belligerent aggrieved by IW incursions should be that the bellig-
erent may take such actions as are necessary in the territory of a neutral that is 
unable (or perhaps unwilling) to counter enemy IW force activities, making 
unlawful use of that territory, a principle from the law of naval warfare. ll3 
Beyond these general rules applying to neutrality in a context of all warfare 
modes, the rules begin to diverge among the different kinds of armed conflict, 
the closest kinship being seen between the law of naval warfare and aerial war-
fare, particularly naval warfare. From a geographic perspective, these mediums 
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for combat offer more persuasive reasons for analogy to IW. Both are concerned 
with "fluid" mediums, like the Internet's electronic pathways.114 The law of na-
val warfare is concerned with warfare on the high seas, a part of the globe that is 
no nation's property. It also is concerned with ocean areas over which coastal 
States may exercise sovereignty, i.e., the territorial sea; or jurisdiction, i.e., the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). There is also a relatively well-developed set of 
rules or general principles in the LOS and the law of naval warfare upon which 
analogies for IW may be drawn. lIS Closer examination of the LOS and the law 
of naval warfare in connection with and its interfaces with Charter law, the LOS 
and treaty termination or suspension principles may produce analogies suitable 
for developing IW principles. 
The LOAC is replete with notice requirements.116 The new technology 
might be employed to give notice, adequate under the circumstances, in tradi-
tional warfare situations in addition to the usual means of doing so. Given IW 
technology's fluidity and e:l>.l'onential growth, the relative lack (thus far) of prac-
tice in IW situations, and the relatively minimal number (again thus far) of claims 
and counterclaims117 in the worldwide electronic arena, any international 
agreement(s) on IW would likely be obsolete in terms of hardware and practice 
before their ink would be dry.llS Haphazard as the prospect may be, rules for IW 
should be left to developing customary norms and general principles, perhaps 
with help from commentators,119 before serious consideration of a treaty begins. 
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26. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, § 103. 
27. Cj. Helsinki Principle 1.2 & cmt., supra note 13, at 499. 
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28. UN Charter, art. 2(5); Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War alld the .lAw of War, 47 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 365, 371-72 (1953). Pennanendy neutral 
countries have supported UN action. See, e.g., GABRIEL, supra note 5, at 132-33 (Swedish, S\viss 
economic aid and/or support during Korean War); ROSS, supra note 5, chs. 7-9 (Swedish, Swiss 
actions against Rhodesia). 
29. Helsinki Principles 1.4, 3.1, 4, supra note 13, at 500, 503, 505; ANNOTATED 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~~ 8.1-8.1.3; SANREMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~~ 34-42,44,46. 
30. International law prohibits belligerents' hostile acts in neutral territory, including a 
neutral's land and internal waters, territorial sea, and airspace, or using neutral territory as a 
sanctuary. Convention Respecting Rights & Duties of Neutral Powers & Persons in Case of War 
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1,36 Stat. 2310, 2322 (Hague V); Convention Concerning Rights & 
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 2, 36 Stat. 2415, 2427 (Hague XIII); 
Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 28, 1928, art. 3, 47 Stat. 1989, 1991, 135 L.N.T.S. 187, 
196 (Maritime Neutrality Convention). The United States is party to it and to the Convention 
Regarding Rights of Neutrals at Sea,July 22,1854,10 id. 1105, in force among Nicaragua, the 
former USSR and the United States. TIF, supra note 15, at 445-46, 470-71. See also General 
Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics, Oct. 3, 1939, ~ 3(a), 3 BEVANS 604, 605 
(General Declaration), among 21 Western Hemisphere countries including the United States; 
Declaration for the Purpose of Establishing Similar Rules of Neutrality, May 27, 1938, arts. 8-10, 
11, 188 L.N.T.S. 294, 301, 308-09, 315, 321, 329 (Nordic Neutrality Rules), among Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Commission of Jurists, Hague Rules of Air Warfare, Dec. 
1922 - Feb. 1923 (Hague Air Rules) art. 40, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, 
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 207,214 (3d ed. 1988). See also Helsinki Principle 1.4, supra 
note 13, at 500; 3 HYDE, supra note 5, § 887; 2 HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 785 (1985); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 
7.3; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~~ 17-18; US Department of the Air Force, 
International Law-The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations ~ 2-6c (1976) (AFP 
110-31). Hague V, supra, reflects custom as to its rules on neutral territory; ANNOTATED 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~~ 7.3 n.22, 7.3.2 n.32. Where the Maritime Neutrality Convention, 
supra, parallels their terms, it too can be assumed to restate custom. Hague Air Rules, supra, are 
generally regarded as declaring customary law. 
31. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; see also note 9, Pact of Paris, supra note 11; United States 
Department of State, Treaties in Force 439 (1998) (TIF); GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 
614-17; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 1116-25. Commentators and countries continue debating 
whether anticipatory self-defense, i.e., a response with force that is necessary, proportional and 
admitting of no other alternative, is permitted in the UN Charter era. Compare, c.g., Nicaragua 
Case, supra note 20, at 14, 347 (Schwebel, J., dissenting); STANlMAR A. ALE.,'{ANDROV, 
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (1996); BOWETT, 
supra note 5, at 187-93; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, § 127; KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 
supra note 5, at 27; MCCORMACK, supra note 20, at 122-24, 238-39, 253-84, 302; MCDOUGAL 
& FELICIANO, supra note 5, at 232-41; SCHACHTER, supra note 18, at 152-55; SHARP, supra note 
4, at 33-48 (real debate is the scope of the anticipatory self-defense right; responses must be 
proportional); STONE, supra note 20, at 3; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 127; Bunn, supra 
note 20, at 69-70; Greenwood, Remarks, in Panel, supra note 20, at 158, 160-61; Linnan, supra 
note 20, at 57, 65-84, 122; Lowe, supra note 14, at 127-30; McHugh, supra note 20, at 61; 
Mullerson & Scheffer, supra note 20, at 93, 109-14; Murphy, supra note 20, at 241; Reisman, supra 
note 20, at 25, 45; Robertson, supra note 20, at 89, 101; Turner, supra note 20, at 43, 62-80; 
Waldock, supra note 20, at 451, 496-99 (anticipatory self-defense permissible, as long as principles 
of necessity, proportionality observed) with, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 257-61,275-78, 
366-67; DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 182-87, 190; HENKIN, supra note 20, at 121-22;JESSUP, supra 
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note 20, at 166-67; O'CONNELL, supra note 20, at 83,171; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, 52aa, at 
156; RIFAAT, supra note 20, at 126; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 675-76; Farer, supra note 20, at 30, 
36-37; Kolosov, supra note 20, at 232, 234; Kunz, supra note 20, at 872,878; Lagoni, supra note 20, 
at 161,162; Tucker, TIle Illterpretation if War Under Present IlItemationalLAw, supra note 20, at 11, 
29-30; see also Tucker, Reprisals and Self-DefellSe, supra note 20, at 586 (States may respond only 
after being attacked). The fonner USSR generally subscribed to the restrictive view. Kolosov, 
supra note 20, at 234; Mullerson & Scheffer, supra note 20, at 107. US policy is that States may 
respond in anticipatory self-defense, subject to necessity and proportionality principles, and 
admitting of no other alternative. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5,';~ 4.3.2-4.3.2.1. 
Nicaragua Case, supra note 20, at 103, declined to address the issue. 
32. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also supra notes 20, 31. A neutral member of a collective 
self-defense alliance, permitted by UN Charter, art. 51, may assist an alliance member that is a 
target of aggression by joining the self-defense response. If that occurs, whatever neutrality the 
assisting State might have claimed is lost, and it becomes a cobelligerent against the aggressor. On 
the other hand, it is possible for the neutral member to declare neutrality and confine its responses 
to retorsions and nonforce reprisals. If so, this may be a violation of the alliance treaty, but that is a 
matter between the neutral and the target of aggression. If a belligerent attacks enemy forces taking 
refuge on neutral territory, or these forces are there for other purposes, 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 
5, § 320, at 685, says this is not hostilities against a neutral, "but are mere violations of neutrality; 
and they must be repulsed, or reparation must be made for them, ... ," citing id. § 362. Besides a 
violation of neutrality law, it is submitted that an attacking belligerent, unless attacking under a 
theory of necessity, has committed a violation of UN Charter, art. 2(4), rendering it susceptible to 
self-defense or other responses by the invaded neutral; if. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, § 326. 
33. In naval warfare, for example, if a neutral cannot or will not enforce its duty to require 
belligerent forces to cease and desist from the conduct of hostilities while in that neutral's waters, an 
aggrieved belligerent may act against those belligerent forces present in neutral waters. Helsinki 
Principle 2.1, supra note 13, at 501; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 7.3; 2 
O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 1118-19 (Dresdell, Altmark incidents); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, 
§§ 325-25a (same). 
34. UN Charter, arts:51, 103; see also supra notes 20, 31, 32 and accompanying text. 
35. Under Hague V, Art. 3, and Hague XIII, Art. 5, the latter applying to naval warfare, 
belligerents may not "(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or 
other apparatus for ... communicating \vith belligerent forces on land or sea; [or] (b) Use any 
installation of this kind established by them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for 
purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages." 
Hague V, supra note 30; Hague XIII, supra note 30. Under Hague V, Arts. 8-9, "A neutral Power is 
not called upon to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of belligerents of telegraph or telephone 
cables or of \vireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to companies of private individuals .... 
Every measure of restriction or prohibition ... must be impartially applied ... to both belligerents. 
A neutral Power must see to the same obligation being observed by companies or ... individuals 
owning telegraph or telephone cables or \vireless telegraphy apparatus." The 1923 Hague Radio 
Rules echo these principles, adding that belligerent mobile radio stations must abstain from using 
their apparatus. Commission of Jurists to Consider & Report Upon Revision of Rules ofW arfare, 
Rules for the Control of Radio in Time of War, Feb. 19, 1923, arts. 2-4 (Hague Radio Rules), 
rcpri/lted ill LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 14, at 367,368. 
36. See supra note 33 and accompanying teJ.1:. 
37. A neutral cannot, however, allow belligerents to establish intelligence offices on its 
territory. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 356, at 748-51; see also 11 WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 
220. 
38. See supra note 35. 
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39. Hague V, supra note 30, art. 19,36 Stat. at 2326; compare Convention with Respect to 
Laws & Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, Regulations, art. 54, 32 id. 1803, 1823; see also 2 
LEVIE, supra note 30, at 832. 
40.2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 355, at 747. 
41. Hague V, supra note 30, arts. 13-14,36 Stat. at 2324-25; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, 
supra note 5, ~ 7.3.1. 
42. This is by analogy from the rule that vehicles transporting sick and wounded carry no 
combatants or war materials and rules for belligerent radio stations on neutral territory. See sf/pra 
notes 35-36 and 39-41 and accompanying text. 
43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
44. See UN Charter, art. 103. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 
1982, art. 221, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 489 (LOS Convention); Convention Relating to Intervention 
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, art. 1(1), 26 U.S.T. 765, 767, 
970 U.N.T.S. 211, 212 (Intervention Convention); see also 4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ONTHELAWOFTHESEA:ACOMMENTARY~~221.1-221.9(h) (MyronH. Nordquistetal. eds., 
1991); 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 1006-8. The 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions and the 
LOS Convention "other rules" clauses, repeated in the navigational articles, have almost 
universally been said to mean the LOS is subject to the LOAC in appropriate situations. Compare, 
e.g., LOS Convention preamble (matters not regulated by Convention to be governed by rules, 
principles ofinternationallaw), arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19(1), 21 (1),31 (innocent passage), 34(2) 
(straits transit passage), 58(1), 58(3) (EEZs), 78(2) (continental shelf; coastal State cannot infringe or 
interfere \vith "navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided in this 
Convention"), 87(1) (high seas), 138 (the Area), 303(4) (archaeological, historical objects found at 
sea; "other international agreements and rules of international law regarding the protection of 
objects of an archaeological and historical nature"), 1833 U.N. T.S. at 398, 400, 404-05, 408, 410, 
419, 431-32, 446, 517, with, e.g., Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, preamble, art. 2, 13 
U.S.T. 2312, 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. 11,82 (High Seas Convention), (treaty restates customary law); 
Convention on the Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2), 
15 id. 1606, 1608, 1610, 1611, 1612,516 U.N.T.S. 205, 206-08, 214, 216, 220 (Territorial Sea 
Convention). Although the other 1958 law of the sea conventions do not have other rules clauses, 
they say they do not affect the status of waters above that are part of the high seas, for the 
continental shelf; or other high seas rights, for high seas fisheries. Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1, 3, id. 471, 473, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312, 314 (Continental Shelf 
Convention); Convention on Fishing & Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 
29,1958, arts. 1-8, 13, 17 id. 138,140-43,559 U.N.T.S. 285, 286-92, 296 (Fishery Convention); 
Territorial Sea Convention, supra, art. 24(1), 15 id. at 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. at 220 (contiguous 
zone). Thus the High Seas Convention regime, including its Article 2 other rules provision, is 
incorporated by reference into these Conventions, which modifY some High Seas Convention 
principles but not the Article 2 other rules clause. The LOS Convention, supra, art. 33, 1833 
U.N.T.S. at 409, governing the contiguous zone, refers to an ocean belt contiguous to the 
territorial sea, which is part of the high seas except declared EEZ, fishing or continental shelf areas, 
othenvise subject to the high seas regime. See also JESSUP, supra note 2;JESSUP & DEAK, supra note 
3; W. ALISON PHILLIPS & ARTHUR H. REEDE, NEUTRALITY: THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD 
(1936); EDGAR TURLINGTON, NEUTRALITY: ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW (1936). 
45. The LOS conventions also promote a due regard principle for shared ocean uses; one user 
must observe due regard for other users' rights, e.g., a right to lay cables that might carry Internet 
messages. Compare LOS Convention, supra note 44, arts. 87, 112-15, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 433, 440 
with High Seas Convention, supra note 44, arts. 2, 26-29, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 2319-20, 450 
U.N.T.S. at 82,96-98; Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables, Mar. 14, 1884,24 Stat. 
989; Declaration Respecting Interpretation of Articles II & IV, Dec. 1, 1886, 25 id. 1424; see also 
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COlOMBOS, slIpra note 5, §§ 399-400; 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY ~ 87.9(k) (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eas., 1995); 
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, slIpra note 5, ~ 2.4.3; 2 O'CONNEll, slIpra note 5, at 796-99, 
819-24; 1 OPPENHEIM, slIpra note 17, §§ 285, at 789; 310-11; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), slIpra 
note 18, § 521(3); Bernard H. Oxman, TI,e Regime if Warships Under the Ullited Nations Conventioll 
Oil the Law if the Sea, 24 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 837-88 (1984); Horace 
B. Robertson, Jr., TI,e "New" unu if the Sea alld the Law if Anned COliflict at Sea, 273-74, in 
READINGS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 
1978-1994 (John N. Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 1994) (Vol. 68, US Naval War College 
International Law Studies). Due regard clauses apply to other sea areas. See, e.g., LOS Convention, 
slIpra note 44, arts. 27(4) (territorial sea), 39(3) (a) (straits transit passage), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3) (EEZ), 
79(5) (cables, pipelines), 142(1), 148 (the Area), 234 (ice-covered areas), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407-08, 
411-12,418-20,430,448,450,493; Continental Shelf Convention, slIpra note 44, arts. 1,3-5(1), 
15 U.S.T. at 473, 499 U.N.T.S. at 312, 314 ("reasonable measures for e};ploration ... [and] 
el, .. ploitation" of continental shelf balanced against right to lay, maintain submarine cables, 
pipelines; continental shelf exploration, e.'''ploitation must not result in "unjustifiable interference 
with" navigation, high seas fishing, oceanographic research); Territorial Sea Convention, slIpra 
note 44, art. 19(4), 15 U.S.T. at 1611, 516 U.N.T.S. at 216-18 (due regard for navigation 
interests); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), slIpra note 18, §§ 511(b)-511(d), 514-15. LOS 
Convention, slIpra note 44, art. 311(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 519, declares it supersedes the 
Continental Shelf, High Seas and Territorial Sea Conventions, slIpra note 44, among parties to the 
LOS Convention. Recent commentaries advocate a due regard standard for belligerents during 
war; e.g., they must pay due regard to neutrals' high seas, continental shelf and EEZ rights and 
duties besides observing other LOAC rules. Helsinki Principles 3.1,4 & cmts., slIpra note 13, at 
503,505; San Remo Manual, slIpra note 12, ~~ 34-36; Robertson, slIpra at 303. Helsinki Principle 
1.4, cmt., slIpra note 13 at 500-01, recites a due regard standard in a context of requiring 
proportional attacks under the LOAC where neutral territory, waters or airspace might be 
involved. 
46. See slIpra note 44 and accompanying text. 
47. A country creating the state of impossibility of performance cannot invoke the principle. 
Vienna Convention, sllpra note 20, art. 61, 1155 U.N.T.S., at 346; BROWNLIE, sllpra note 17, at 
623; T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 177-87 (1974); REsTATEMENT (THIRD), 
slIpra note 18, §§ 102-03, 128-30; Helsinki Principle 1.3 & cmt., slIpra note 13, at 499; 
International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, Report if the 
Commissioll to the Gelleral Assembly, UN Doc. Al6309/Rev. 1, reprinted ill 2 (1974) YEARBOOK OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 225-26 (lLC Report); 1 OPPENHEIM, slIpra note 17, 
§ 650; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), slIpra note 18, § 336 cmt. c & r.n.3; George K. Walker, Illtegration 
and Disintegratioll ill Ellrope: Reorderillg the Treaty Map if the COlltillellt, 6 TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 
65-66 (1993); bllt see LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 685 (2d ed. 1961) (no separate 
impossibility doctrine). 
48. Fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked to suspend or terminate 
humanitarian law treaty obligations, particularly their reprisal provisions, or by a party causing the 
problem. Vienna Convention, slIpra note 20, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347; see also 
Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovakia), 1997 I.CJ. 7, 39 (art. 62 a customary norm); 
Pisheriesjllrisdictioll (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.CJ. 3,18 (same); BROWNLIE, slIpra note 17, at 623-26; 
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 657,662-63 (1935); Helsinki Principle 1.3 & cmt., sllpra 
note 13, at 499; McNAIR, slIpra note 47, at 685-91; 1 OPPENHEIM, slIpra note 17, § 651; 
REsTATEMENT (THIRD), slIpra note 18, §§ 336, 339; IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 20 (2d ed. 1984); David Bederman~ T71e 1871 London 
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Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations, 82 AMERICANJOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1988); Gyorgy Harsatzti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of 
Circumstances, 146 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE De DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1,21 
(1975); Walker, supra note 47, at 66-68; compare ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY 
TERMINATION ch. 1 (1975); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 895 (1967) (criticizing Vienna Convention 
approach) with ELIAS, supra note 47, at 119-28 (traditional rebus sic stantibus approach no longer 
admissible today). 
49. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346; see aL~o 
Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 48, at 39 (Article 60 a customary norm); Namibia, 1971 
I.CJ. 4, 47; BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 622-23; ILC Report, supra note 47, at 253-255; 
MCNAIR, supra note 47, ch. 36; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, § 649; SINCLAIR, supra note 48, at 
20, 166, 188-90. 
50. Kahghan, supra note 20, at 767,827. Belligerents can respond by non-force reprisals or 
retorsions. TUCKER, supra note 5, at 199 n.5. Reprisal has been characterized as a kind of self-help 
or sanction. Most commentators say reprisals involving force against a State not engaged in armed 
conflict with the acting State are not lawful in the Charter era. However, other coercion that is 
unlawful, e.g., deliberate breach of a trade treaty to compel a State engaging in unlawful conduct to 
comply with international norms, is admissible. Anticipatory reprisal using force is forbidden. A 
State considering reprisal must first call upon an offending State to mend its ways. Compare 
Declaration on Principles ofInternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations & Co-Operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, ~~ 1,3, UN 
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. Al8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1294, 
1297 (1970); Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 48, at 54; Nicaragua Case, sllpra note 20, at 14, 
127; Air Service Agreement of27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443; BOWETT, supra 
note 5, at 13;J.B. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 401-02 (HumphreyWaldock ed., 6th ed. 
1963); BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 281; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 340-47; ROSALYN 
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL 
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 217 (1963); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 
6.2.3.1; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 43, 52a, at 152-53; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 105; STONE, 
supra note 5, at 286-87; Roberto Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. 
AlCNAI318 & Add. 104, (1979), 2(1) YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION 13, 39, 42 (1981); Roberto Barsotti, Amled Reprisals, in ANTHONY CASSESSE, 
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 79 (1986); D.W. Bowett, 
Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AMERiCANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 
(1972); Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Toward Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in 
CASSESSE, supra, at 435, 444; Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense, supra note 20, at 586-87; with 
DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 215-16 (reprisals using force admissible in Charter era); LAWRENCE T. 
GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (1998). 
Retorsion, or retortion, is a target State's lawful but unfriendly response to another State's 
unfriendly practice or act whether illegal or not, to coerce the latter to discontinue that practice or 
act. Retorsionary responses must be proportional. BRIERLY, supra, at 399; WILLIAM EDWARD 
HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 120 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924); 2 
HYDE, supra note 5, § 588; FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 27 (1971); 7 
MOORE, DIGEST § 1090; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 135; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra 
note 18, § 905 & r.n.8; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 104; STONE, supra note 5, at 288-89; Waldock, 
supra note 20, at 451,458. 
51. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344,347. 
52. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, does not provide for the operation of war, or armed 
conflict, on international agreements. However, other authorities agree that war may suspend or 
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tenninate treaties, depending on the nature of the treaty and the circumstances of the conflict. See, 
e.g., ILC Report, supra note 47, at 267; Institut de Droit International, The Effects oj Anned Conflict 
011 Treaties, Aug. 28, 1985, arts. 2, 3, 5, 11, 61(2) Annuaire 278, 280-82 (1986); RegulatiollS 
Regardillg the Effect oj War 011 Treaties, 1912, arts. 1, 4,7-10, reprillted ill 7 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153-55 (1913); Clark v. Allell, 331 U.S. 503, 513 (1947); Kamuth v. Ullited 
States, 79 U.S. 231, 240-42 (1929); Techtv. Hughes, 128N.E.185, 191 (N.Y.), cert. dellied, 254 U.S. 
643 (1920); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 99(4)-99(5); George B. Davis, The Effects ojWar UpOIl 
[lltemational COllventiollS and Private COlltracts, 1927 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-29; G.G. Fitzmaurice, TheJudidal Clauses ojthe Peace Treaties, 73 
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 255,307-17 (1948); 
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 657, 662-64 (1935); CecilJ.B. Hurst, The Effect oj War 011 
Treaties, 2 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37,40 (1921); James J. Lenoir, The 
Effect oj War Oil Bilateral Treaties, with Spedal Riference to Redprocal [llheritallce Treaty ProvisiollS, 34 
GEOREGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 129, 173-77 (1946); Walker, supra note 47, at 68-71. 
Impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances claims may overlap war suspension or 
tennination claims. Impossibility, fundamental change, etc., are the only bases for tennination or 
suspension for treaty relations between belligerents and neutrals. Herbert W. Briggs, The Attorney 
General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus, 36 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 
(1942); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Cirall/lstances, 61 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 911 (1967); Walker, sllpra note 47, at 68-69. 
53. See SIIpra note 33 and accompanying te:l.."t. 
54. See supra note 30 and accompanying te:l.."t. 
55. See sllpra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
56. Hague V, Hague XIII, Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 30; Vienna 
Convention, supra note 20, preamble, art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333,341; BROWNLIE, sllpra note 
17,at5; 1 OPPENHEIM,supranote 17, §§ 10, at 28, 11, at 32-36; RESTATEMENT (THIRD),sllpra 
note 18, § 102(3) & cmt. £ 
57. Hague V, supra note 30, art. 5, 36 Stat. at 2323; Hague XIII, supra note 30, art. 25, id. at 
2432; Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 30, arts. 4(a), 26, 47 id. at 1991, 1994, 135 
L.N. T .S. at 196, 208; General Declaration, sllpra note 30, 3( c), at 605; Hague Air Rules, supra note 
30, arts. 42, 47, at 214-15; AFP 110-31, supra note 30, ~ 2-6c (air operations principle; Hague Air 
Rules, supra, not cited); 3 HYDE, supra note 5, §§ 855, 856A, 888; 2 LEVIE, supra note 30, at 788; 
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 7.3; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 316, 323, 325; 
TUCKER, supra note 5, at 260-61; bllt see Helsinki Principle 2.2, sllpra note 13, at 502 (neutral 
"must" take measures to enforce warship transit, sojourn rules). 
58. This includes interning crew. If an enemy prize is brought to a neutral port under distress 
or similar conditions and does not leave when directed, its crew must be interned. Hague XIII, 
supra note 30, arts. 21, 22, 24, 36 Stat. at 2431-32; see also Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra 
note 30, art. 17,47 Stat. at 1993,135 L.N.T.S. at 204; Nordic Neutrality Rules, sllpranote 30, art. 
4(1), 188 L.N.T.S. at 299, 305, 311, 319, 325. Hague XIII, supra note 30, art. 23 provides for an 
exception to this rule, entry of prizes under other than distress conditions, but several nations, 
including the United States, reserved to art. 23. See 36 Stat. at 2432,2438. Hague XIII, arts. 21-22 
are customary law; art. 23 is not because of US and UK reservations, now applying to more States 
through treaty succession principles. The S.S. Appal/l, 243 U.S. 124, 150-51 (1917); 3 HYDE, supra 
note 5, §§ 862, 864; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 328a; 333, at 706; 345; Symposium, State 
Successioll ill the Fonner Soviet Unioll and ill Eastern Europe, 33 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (1993); Walker, supra note 47. Neutrals must allow belligerent 
warship entry for asylum, distress or other purposes if they comply ,vith innocent passage rules. 
LOS Convention, supra note 44, arts. 18-19, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404 (innocent passage in distress, 
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but subject to other rules of international law, i.e., LOAC); Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 
44, arts. 1(2), 14, 15 U.S.T. 1608, 1610,516 U.N.T.S. 206, 214; Helsinki Principle 2.2, supra note 
13, at 502; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 3.2.2.1; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 
343-46; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 21. 
59. Convention Respecting Laws & Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Regulations, 
Art. 54, 36 Stat. 2227, 2308. This is limited to land warfare when a belligerent occupies enemy 
territory and seizes or destroys landing ends of cables connecting that territory with a neutral State. 
COLOMBOS, supra note 5, § 569. 
60. COLOMBOS, supra note 5, § 576; United States Department of the Navy, Law of Naval 
Warfare: NWIP 10-2 ~ 520b (1955 through Change 6,1974) (NWIP 10-2); compare Institute of 
International Law, The Laws of Naval War Governing the Relations Between Belligerents, art. 54 
(1913), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 30, at 857,867 (Oxford Naval Manual). 
Modern manuals do not analyze the issue thoroughly, probably because of disuse of cables. See SAN 
REMo MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 37. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 1.6, at 24 
discusses cables in an LOS conte:Kt; see also supra note 45 and accompanying tel>."t. 
61. See supra note 38 and accompanying teA"t. 
62. Neutral merchant ships acquire enemy character and may be treated as enemy merchant 
vessels if they operate direcdy under enemy control, orders, charter, employment or direction. 
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 7.5.2; SAN REMo MANUAL, supra note 12, mJ112-17. 
See also Helsinki Principle 5.1.2(4), supra note 13, at 507; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 
8.2.2.2; SAN REMo MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 67. 
63. E.g., hospital ships, medical aircraft; see generally Helsinki Principles 5.1.2(5)-5.1.2(6), 
supra note 13, at 507; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 8.2.3; SAN REMO MANUAL, 
supra note 12, ~~ 47-52, 136-40, 146, 151-52, citing treaties, custom (hospital ships; small coastal 
rescue craft; vessels granted safe conduct; vessels carrying cultural property; liners carrying only 
passengers; ships on religious, non-military scientific or philanthropic missions; small coastal 
fishing boats, coastal traders; vessels that have surrendered; life rafts, life boats). Neutral aircraft 
carrying passengers, or serving as medical or cartel aircraft, are also protected. See ANNOTATED 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 8.2.3; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, '\1'\1140-45, 153-58. 
64. Cj Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Modern Technology and the Law of Amled COliflict at Sea, in 
Robertson, supra note 5, 362, 370; New Technologies and Anlled COliflicts at Sea, 14 SYRACUSE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 678, 704 (1988). This may mean that 
trying to define IW methods or means that are per se unlawful will fail, particularly when 
technology is developing eAl'Onentially. 
65. For a discussion of high seas visit and search, see generally Helsinki Principles 5.2.1, 5.2.7, 
supra note 13, at 509,511; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, '\1~ 7.6-7.6.2; SAN REMO 
MANUAL, supra note 12, '\1~ 116, 118-24. 
66. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
67. E.g., requirements for placing passengers and crew in safety before destroying an enemy 
merchantman. Proces-Verbal Relating to Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the 
Treaty of London of22Apri11930, Nov. 6,1936,3 298,173 L.N.T.S. 353; Treaty for Limitation 
& Reduction of Naval Armaments, Apr. 22, 1930, art. 22(2), 46 Stat. 2858, 2881, 112 L.N.T.S. 
65, 88. See also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra Bevans note 5, ~~ 8.2.2.2, 8.3, 8.4; SAN REMO 
MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 151. 
68. Neutral merchantmen must observe blockades that are duly established and notified and 
are effective and impartial. Helsinki Principles 5.2.10, 5.3, sllpra note 13, at 513; ANNOTATED 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, '\1~ 7.7.1-7.7.5; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~'Il93-104. 
69. Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to Exercise of the 
Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, arts. 1-2,36 Stat. 2396, 2408 (Hague XI). See also 
supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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70. Helsinki Principle 3.3, cmt., supra note 13, at 505; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra 
note 5, 'Ii~ 7.8-7.8.1; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 108 & cmt. 108.1. Helsinki Principle 
3.2, supra at 504, declares: 
Neutral ships should be aware of the risk and peril of operating in areas where active naval 
hostilities take place. Belligerents engaged in naval hostilities must, however, take 
reasonable precautions including appropriate warnings, if circumstances permit, to avoid 
damage to neutral ships. 
This does not authorize converting a naval operations area into a free-fire zone and does not 
obliterate the customary rule that belligerents must warn away neutral shipping from operational 
areas. The Helsinki rule might come into play if there is a chance encounter ofbelligerent forces. 
71. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 
753-{)3 (1962); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 2.4.3.1; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), 
supra note 18, § 521, cmt. b;John H. Pender,Jurisdictiollal Approaches to Maritime Ellvirollmellts: A 
Space Age Perspective, 15 JAG JOURNAL 155-58 (1960); US Delegation Paper, UN Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, Legality ofUsillg the High Seas ill COllllectiollwith Nuclear WeapollS Tests ill the 
Padfic Oceall, Doc. No. US/CLS/Pos/48 (2)-(3), Annex II (Feb. 20, 1958), reprillted ill 4 
MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 546,549 (1968). 
72. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt., supra note 13, at 504; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra 
note 5, ~7.9; SANREMO MANUAL, supra note 12, 'Ii~ 105-08; WALKER, supra note 1,403-10; 
Vaughan Lowe, TIle Impad of the LAw of the Sea Oil Naval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 657,673 (1988); W J. Fenrick, The Exclusioll Zolle ill 
the LAw of Naval Warfare, 1986 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 124-25 
(1986). Helsinki Principle 3.2, supra note 13, at 504, might come into play if there is a chance 
encounter of belligerent forces and has no effect on exclusion zone declarations. See also supra note 
70. 
73. See supra notes 68, 70, and 72 and accompanying text. 
74. Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, 'Ii~ 1-4, 181 L.N.T.S. 135, 137-38, amended by 
Agreement Supplementary to NyonArrangement, Sept. 17, 1937, 'Ii~ 1-3, id. 149, 151 appears to 
be the first instance of announced high seas defense zones. The belligerents declared them in the 
1982 Falklands/Malvinas War; the United States announced them in the 1980-88 Tanker War. 
See O'CONNELL, supra note 20, at 80,168,172 (1979); WALKER, supra note 1, 398-400; L.F.E. 
Goldie, Commelltary, ill LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 14, at 489, 493-95; Goldie, 
l\laritime War Zolles alld Exclusioll Zolles, ill Robertson, supra note 5, at 156, 192; O'Connell, 
Intematiotlal LAw alld COli temporary Naval OperatiollS, 44 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-56 (1970). 
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
76. E.g., Agreement on Prevention ofIncidents on & Over the High Seas, May 27,1972, 
USSR-US, 23 U.S.T. 1168, 852 U.N.T.S. 151 (INCSEA); Protocol, May 22,1973,24 id. 1063; 
see also Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12, 1989, USSR-US, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1485, reprillted ill 28 I.L.M. 879 (1989). Other countries had INCSEA treaties with 
the fonner USSR. Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, ~ 2.8 n.ll0. These may be subject to 
treaty succession principles. Symposium, supra note 58; Walker, supra note 47. 
77. E.g., Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 
1972,28 U.S.T. 3459; International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974,32 id. 47, 
in force for most States ,vith many amendments. See gellerally United States Department of State, 
Treaties in Force 406-09 (1998) (TIF). 
78. The legal basis for an ADIZ is a nation's right to establish reasonable conditions for entry 
into its territory. AFP 110-31, supra note 30, ~ 2-1g; MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., LAW AND 
PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 307-09 (1963); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 2.5.2.3; 
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REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, § 521, r.n.2; NWIP 10-2, supra note 60, 11 422b; Note, 
Air Dgfllse Identification Zolles: Creeping Jurisdiction in the Airspace, 18 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 485 (1978). US ADIZs are published in 14 C.F.R. part 99 (1999). Cj. 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7, 1944, arts. 3, 8, 11,61 
Stat. 1181-83, 15 U.N.T.S. 298, 300, 304, requiring non-military aircraft to submit to rules for 
entering another State's territory unless there has been a prior agreement. 
79. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
80. UN Charter, art. 103; see also supra note 15 and accompanying tel\."!:. 
81. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, does not provide for the operation of war, or armed 
conflict, on international agreements. However, other authorities agree that war may suspend or 
terminate treaties, depending on the nature of the treaty and the circumstances of the conflict. See, 
e.g., ILC Report, supra note 49, at 267; Institut de Droit International, 17Je Effects ~ An/led COI!t1iCt 
on Treaties, Aug. 28,1985, arts. 2, 3, 5,11, 61(2} Annuaire 278, 280-82 (1986); id., Regulations 
Regarding the Effect ~Waron Treaties, 1912, arts. 1,4,7-10, reprinted ill 7 AMERICANJOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153-55 (1913); Clark v. Allell, 331 U.S. 503, 513 (1947); Kamuth v. United 
States, 79 U.S. 231, 240-42 (1929); Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y.), cert. det/ied, 254 
U.S. 643 (1920); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 99(4)-99(5); Davis, supra note 52, at 124-29; 
Fitzmaurice, supra note 52, at 255,307-17; Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
supra note 52, art. 35(b), at 662-64; Hurst, supra note 52, at 37,40; Lenoir, supra note 52, at 129, 
173-77; Walker, supra note 47, at 68-71. Impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances 
claims may overlap war suspension or termination claims. Impossibility, fundamental change, etc. 
are the only bases for termination or suspension for treaty relations between belligerents and 
neutrals. Briggs, supra note 52, at 89; Lissitzyn, supra note 52, at 911; Walker, supra note 47, at 
68-69. 
82. Helsinki Principles 1.4, 3.1, 4, supra note 13, at 500, 503, 505; ANNOTATED 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~1l8.1-8.1.3; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~1l34-42, 44, 46; 
see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
83. LOS Convention, supra note 44, arts. 18-19, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404; Territorial Sea 
Convention, supra note 58, art. 14, 15 U.S.T. at 1610,516 U.N.T.S. at 214; Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7,1944, arts. 1,3,61 Stat. 1180, 1181, 
15 U.N.T.S. 295, 298; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, 11 2.3.2.1, at 2-9; 1 
O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 118. Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 30, art. 14,47 Stat. 
at 1993; General Declaration, supra note 30, ~~ 3(a), 3(f), at 605; Hague Air Rules, supra note 30, 
art. 40, at 214; AFP 110-31, supra note 30, 1l2-6c; Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 30, art. 8, 
188 L.N.T.S. at 301,309,315,321,329 (air ambulances excepted); ANNOTATED SUPPLEl'.1ENT, 
supra note 5, 117.3.7; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 341a; SANREMO MANUAL, supra note 12,11 
18. During World War II neutrals prohibited belligerent military aircraft entry. 11 WHITEMAN, 
supra note 5, at 357-58. 
84. I.CJ. Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, §§ 102-D3. 
85. Compare Hague Air Rules, supra note 30, art. 48, at 215, with Hague V, supra note 30, art. 
10, 36 Stat. at 2324 and Hague XIII, supra note 30, art. 26, id. at 2433 ("unfriendly act"}. 
86. See supra note 50 and accompanying tel\."!:. 
87. Today, most commentators say a State cannot invoke a reprisal involving use offorce, 
except when a State is a belligerent and "vishes to respond, after request for the offender to comply 
with the law, with a proportional reprisal against an enemy. See supra note 50 and accompanying 
text. 
88. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
89. If a belligerent orders an aircraft from a company or person in neutral territory, the neutral 
must prescribe a route for the aircraft away from the neighborhood of military operations of the 
belligerent's opponent and "must exact whatever guarantees may be required to ensure that the 
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aircraft follows the route prescribed." General Declaration, supra note 30, ~ 3(t), at 605; Hague Air 
Rules, supra note 30, art. 46, at 214. 
90. Hague Air Rules, supra note 30, art. 47, at 215; see also Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 
30, art. 13, 188 L.N.T.S. at 303, 309, 315, 323, 329; Harvard Draft Convention on Rights & 
Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, art. 6, 33 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 175, 245 (Supp. 1939) (Harvard Draft Neutrality Convention); 2 LEVIE, 
supra note 30, at 827. 
91. Compare Hague Air Rules, supra note 30, art. 30, at 212 witTz AFP 110-31, supra note 30, ~ 
2-6b (aircraft entering area of immediate air operations subject to "damages" from hostilities; 
belligerents cannot deny neutral aircraft access to international airspace even ifbound for enemy 
territory); Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, f1~ 7.8-7.8.1; San Remo Manual, supra note 12, ~ 
108 & cmt. 108.1; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text. Helsinki Principle 3.2, supra at 504, 
might come into play if there is a chance encounter of belligerent forces. 
92. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 2.4.3.1; see also supra note 71 and 
accompanying text. 
93. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 7.9; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, f1~ 
105-08; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra notes 83, 89 and accompanying text. 
97. UN Charter, art. 103; see also supra notes 9, 15,25 and accompanying text. 
98. See supra note 81 and accompanying teA"!:. 
99. See supra notes 45,82 and accompanying text. 
100. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975,28 id. 
695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (Registration Convention); Convention on International Liability for 
Damages Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 id. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (Liability 
Convention); Liability Convention; Treaty on Principles Governing Activities in Exploration & 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,1967, art. 6-8, 18 
U.S.T. 2410, 2415-16, 610 U.N.T.S. 209 (Outer Space Treaty); Agreement on Rescue of 
Astronauts, Return of Astronauts, & Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 
1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (Rescue & Return Agreement). 
101. See supra notes 2-53 and accompanying teA"!:. 
102.2 O'CONNELL, supra 1I0te 5, at 1142. Some limited, or localized, wars may have been total 
war from the belligerents' perspectives, but on a world scale basis, they might be considered local or 
limited in nature. One recent example is the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict, the maritime aspects of 
which are examined in WALKER, supra 1I0te 1, ch. 2. 
103. JESSUP, supra note 2 at 156 ("There is nothing new about revising neutrality; it has 
undergone an almost constant process of revision in detail.") See also supra notes 2-5 and 
accompanying text. 
104. SeegellerallyACLU v. Rello, 929 F. Supp 824, 830-38 (B.D.Pa. 1996)., qffd, 521 U.S. 844, 
849-53 (1997); G. BURGESS ALISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET (1995); 
PHILIP BACZEWSKl BT AL, THE INTERNET UNLEASHED (1994); KATIE HAFNER & 
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET 
(1996); GeorgeJohnson, From Two Small Nodes, a MigTzty Web Has Growl!, NEW YORK TIMES, 
Oct. 12, 1999, atDl; for historical analyses of the development of computers and the Internet. As 
\Vorld War II ended, Vannevar Bush suggested the basic idea of a personal computer; he traced the 
history of calculators, discussed speech-controlled typewriters, and advocated document storage 
on super fine grain microfilm shuffied by mechanical fingers. Bush believed that new logic and new 
symbolism would be necessary. Although he missed the idea of electronic communication, much 
of what Bush wrote in this perspective, futuristic article has become reality, albeit in different 
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modalities. Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, 176 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 101 O'uly 1945); 
Johnson, slIpra. Mechanical computers were used aboard warships before W orId War II to supply 
fire control solutions to naval guns through electrical circuits. Although most firing corrections on 
these computers were made aboard ship by telephone communications among gunners and fire 
control personnel who operated visual or radar-assisted gun directors and ship's combat 
information centers (i.e., a room aboard ship where radar repeaters portrayed shell splashes), shore 
bombardment effects and recommendations for corrections sometimes came by radio 
communications between ships and shore spotters, e.g., Army or Marine Corps forward artillery 
observers on the ground or in aircraft. The ship's computer "stored" prior information that had 
been inserted and retained this information until it was changed by operators. Information might 
be relayed through internal ship communications, perhaps to other computers aboard ship, but 
there was no data transfer among e}"1:ernal computers, i.e., those on other vessels. Antisubmarine 
warfare systems, shipboard torpedo attack systems, and submarine fire control systems for torpedo 
attack employed similar fire control solutions, using electronics-based systems (e.g., sonar, radar) 
and mechanical devices operated in similar fashion, but there was little, if any, information 
exchange between an attacking ship and other stations. These systems operate in similar fashion 
today, although electronics-based computers have replaced mechanical systems, and missiles have 
replaced gun projectiles in many cases. 
1 05. "When the legal community first considered the .... regime that governed state activities 
and military operations in Cyber Space, some U.S. government attorneys stated rather boldly that 
(applying) modem information systems technology to military purposes was so new that I/O law 
applied." SHARP, slIpra note 5, at 5. A policy behind this approach is national sovereignty. See UN 
Charter, art 2(1); S.S. LotllS (Fr. V. Turk), 1927 PC. IJ., Ser. A, No. 10, at 4,18. 
106. Cj I.CJ. Statute, Art 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) slIpra note 18, at 102-03. 
107. E.g. Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, An Assessment ofInternational 
Legal Issues in Information Operations (Nov. 1999). The paper is appended to this volume as the 
Appendix. See also GREENBERG, slIpra note 50, at 17; SHARP, slIpra note 5, at 5. 
108. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 25, 48, 51, 103; see alsosllpra notes 2-44 and accompanying test. 
109. See, e.g., International Convention on Civil & Political Right, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 4, 
19(3)(b) (derogation clauses), 17 (forbidding interference ,vith correspondence), 19 (freedom of 
expression), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174, 177, 178; European Convention for Protection of Human 
Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,1950, arts. 6(1), 8(2), 10(2) (derogation clauses), 8(1) 
(correspondence), 10 (right of free expression regardless of frontiers), 213 id. 221, 228, 230; 
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,1969, art. 13(2) (b) , 27 (derogation clauses), 13 
(freedom of e}""pression regardless of frontiers), 14 (right of reply), 9 I.L.M. 673, 679-80, 683 
(1970). Banjul (African) Charter on Human & Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 9 (rights to 
receive information, disseminate opinions ,vithin the law), 21 id. 58, 60 (1982) has no derogation 
clause; it would be subject, however, to the usual law of treaties principles on impossibility of 
performance, etc. See also SUBATRA ROy CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF 
EMERGENCY 12-13, 22-29, 59, 121-25,210-11 (1989) (analyzing International Law Association 
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency (1984»; MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 813-15 (1980); Joan 
Fitzpatrick, Protection agai/lSt Abllse of the "COI/cept of Emergel/CY," in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN 
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 203 (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL POLICY., LOUIS HENKIN &JOHN LAWRENCE HARGROVE EDS. 
1994); HENKIN, Intematiol/al Hllman Rights as "Rights" 1 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 446-47 (1979); 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, arts. 12, 19,27 U.N.G.A. Res. 217 
(1948), reprinted in DIETRICH RAUSCHNING ET AL., KEy RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1946-1996, at 321-22 (1997). Nllclear Weapol/s, 1996 I. CJ. 226, 
at 239-40, observed that "the protection of the (Civil & Political Rights Covenant) does not cease 
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in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may 
be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not such a 
provision. . . .[T]he right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also during 
hostilities .... [W]hat is an arbitrary deprivation of life ... then £ills to be determined by the 
applicable lex spedalis . .. the [LOAC] ... designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus 
whether a particular loss of life, through use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an 
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to ... the Covenant, can only be decided by ... the [LOAC] 
and not .... from the terms of the Covenant." To the extent that human rights treaty norms 
represent custom, law of treaties analysis does not apply. However, derogations from custom like 
the persistent objector rule do, and will apply to Declaration norms having status as custom. "The 
United States has long denied that any obligation rests upon it when a neutral to attempt to control 
e. .... :pressions of opinion by private persons within its territory and adverse to the cause of any 
belligerent," although the US Government has appealed to its citizenry to refrain from partisanship 
during war. 3 HYDE, slIpra note 5, § 874. 
110. These might be applied through the analogy of the due regard principle, taken from the 
LOS and applied during armed conflict by analogy. See sllpra note 79 and accompanying te},:t. 
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